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Void for Vagueness

by Carl E. Schneider

W

hen law regulates a profession, where does it get its
standards? Largely from the
profession. Members of professions acquire esoteric and abstract knowledge
through formal education and the experience of practice. They use professional
judgment in applying this knowledge to
each case. Because legislatures and
courts lack this expertise, they adopt the
standards of the experts. Thus in a malpractice suit, juries are instructed to determine whether the doctor met medicine's standard of care. Furthermore,
physicians must be called as expert witnesses to guide juries in that work.
Even when lawmakers contemplated
intensifYing their regulation of medicine by creating the duty of informed
consent, they could consult a literature
to which doctors and medical ethicists
contributed crucially. In some jurisdictions, even the scope of the duty is determined by using the medical standard
of disclosure (although in other jurisdictions the standard is the degree of disclosure sufficient to permit the ordinary
patient to make a sound decision).
Nor have lawmakers striven to extend the reach of informed consent beyond the norms of medicine. They
might have done so in two ways. First,
they might have broadened the legal
standard of disclosure. This seems to
have happened only sporadically and
tentatively. Second, fact-finders (juries
and trial-court judges) might have interpreted the legal standard as demanding
elaborate or unusual disclosures. This
too has apparently not much happened.
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Indeed, plaintiffs rarely bring informed
consent actions (except as appendages
to malpractice suits), rarely win them,
and rarely obtain large verdicts.
In short, lawmakers have essentially
established rules intended to hold medicine to its own standards and then
mostly left the system to work unmolested. What lawmakers have not noticed, however, is that the status of informed consent in the medical literature
has become parlous. Two developments
particularly matter. First, a torrent of
empirical evidence now suggests that informed consent does not work as intended: Doctors generally tell patients
too little and patients generally understand too little for patients to make the
choices that lawmakers had imagined.
Second (and relatedly?), the literature seems to be deserting the term "informed consent." And what instead? A
comet shower of novel terms. "[T]here
is now a profusion of competing models
that attempt to convey subtle differences in the sharing of information and
power between clinician and patient." 1
A smattering of the latest models: "evidence-based patient choice," "informed
decision-making," "informed medical
decision-making," "informed treatment
decision-making," "physician as perfect
agent," "shared decision-making,"
"shared clinical decision-making,"
"shared medical decision-making," and
"shared treatment decision-making."
From this welter of multiplying, mystifYing distinctions, one term has
emerged most stoutly-"shared decision-making."

So, what is shared decision-making?
Would that I knew. Or that anyone did.
Makoul and Clayman heroically
slogged through the literature and concluded that "there is no shared definition of shared decision making." They
"identified 31 separate concepts used to
explicate SDM, only two of which appeared in more than half of the conceptual definitions." In fact, "60% of articles that purport to focus on shared decision-making failed to include any
conceptual definition at all." 2
As this suggests, many proponents of
shared decision-making seem to regard
its meaning as self-evident. And no
doubt most people suppose that they
understand the term. "Sharing" does
the real rhetorical work here. Who
doesn't understand sharing? Who could
oppose it? Yet the skimpiest reflection
reveals that the slogan is ambiguous
unto incoherence.
For example, what makes a decision
"shared"? It is logical, plausible, reasonable to say, as many advocates of shared
decision-making seem to say, that anyone who helps shape a decision, helps
give the decision meaning, helps give it
effect, "shares" in it. But on this reading,
virtually all consequential medical decisions are shared. The doctor must propose something; the patient must at
least acquiesce; both have participated;
they have shared the decision.
Or look at "sharing" from another
angle. When doctors and patients talk,
they develop a framework for their conversation and goals for their interaction.
These often emerge implicitly, with neither party really grasping what is happening. Both parties shape the framework and assumptions: Patients initially
state the issue in the case; doctors initially state the solution. These frameworks and assumptions can decisively
shape the conversation and its conclusions. In this sense, again, almost every
decision of any moment is "shared."
In the mess and murk of real life it is
in fact often hard to say who "made" or
even "participated in" a decision. A neurologist wants to do a lumbar puncture.
Patient: "Will the results affect the
choice of treatment?" Doctor: "No....
Let's wait on the LP." What happened?
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The patient did not explicitly state a
preference and perhaps had none. Or
not a clear one. Or a firm one. What if
the doctor had persisted? What would
the patient have said? Why did the doctor desist? What decision was actually
made, and who participated in what
way? Was this a "shared" decision? I was
the patient, and I can't answer any of
these questions.
In short, "shared decision-making"
covers so much that it must mean too
little. But "shared decision-making" is
obscure in still another weighty way: Its
relationship to informed consent is baffling. Does the former describe how the
latter should work, or is it something
fresh? Is it a response to the latter's perceived failure or its perceived nobility?
Does shared decision-making enhance
the patient's authority? Or the doctor's?
Most writing on the subject just ignores
these basic questions. And there is authority for many interpretations.
For example, one defense of shared
decision-making contends that "concern with patient participation in treatment decision-making has moved well
beyond informed consent to include
broader principles of patient autonomy,
control, and patient challenge to physician authority." 3 On this view, shared
decision-making continues the informed consent revolution. But how? I
had always thought informed consent
embodied broad principles of patient autonomy, control, and challenge to
physician authority.
On the other hand, some writing on
shared decision-making implies that
doctors should share not only the decision, but also the authority to make it.
Charles et al., for example, announce
that doctors have a "legitimate investment in the treatment decision" and
that doctors and patients should build a
"consensus."4 This is a far-and disquieting-cry from the usual understanding that patients are the principals and
doctors only their agents.
Plainly proponents of shared decision-making need to give their term a
much better considered and more precise construction. They need to realize
that it has no inherent meaning, that it
describes no natural phenomenon. It is
january-February 2007

a label applied to a prescription for the
way doctors and patients should proceed. Until its proponents agree on the
prescription, shared decision-making
can only be a cipher.
But is agreement possible? Most enthusiasts for shared decision-making
lump all decisions into one homogeneous category. However, medical decisions vary along so many axes that generalizations are doomed. Sometimes decisions rest on reliable evidence, sometimes not. Sometimes choices are few,
sometimes many. Some decisions are
weighty, some trivial. Some choices are
complex, some simple. Some decisions
are recurring, some unique. Some raise
technical questions, some moral questions. Some choices are matters of taste,
others of calculation. Some decisions
must be rushed, some can be leisurely.
Some decisions are made with a longknown doctor, some with a stranger.
Some decisions are made with a trusted
physician, some with a distrusted one.
This list could be lengthily prolonged.
The upshot is that decisions are so various that no single principle can well
guide them all.
Not only do decisions vary, but so do
doctors and patients, and in ways that
dispositively affect how they can, and
want to, and should make decisions.
Doctors differ in specialty, experience,
knowledge, insight, sympathy, tact, loquacity, lucidity, persuasiveness, confidence, patience, optimism, resourcefulness, trustworthiness, and so on and on.
Patients differ-here's the short list-in
intelligence, literacy, numeracy, knowledge, wisdom, confidence, attentiveness, dispassion, judgment, insight,
imagination, experience, anxiety, nerve,
sanity, aggressiveness, suggestibility, deference, and so on and on. Perhaps most
crucially, patients differ enormously in
the way they want their medical decisions made. Worse, they want some
kinds of decisions made differently
from other kinds. Worse yet, patients'
preferences shift with advancing age and
fluctuating health.
So suppose courts and legislatures
concluded that informed consent has
failed to achieve the purpose for which
they instituted it. Suppose they con-

eluded that "shared decision-making!" is
medicine's dernier cri. Could they follow their usual practice of adopting the
profession's standards as their own? No.
A legal rule must be both predictable
and administrable. The subjects of a
rule must be able to discover what the
law requires of them; the people who
administer a rule must be able to comprehend it and apply it efficiently.
Shared decision-making is so enigmatic
that neither condition can be met. Nor,
given the proliferating variety of medical decisions, can a definition that
meets the two conditions be readily
imagined.
Informed consent, in contrast, meets
the two conditions (well, close enough
for government work). It might be unclear in a given case exactly what the
reasonable patient would want to know
about a choice, but the principle that
animates that standard is comprehensible to doctors, juries, and judges. Yet
what use is a predictable and administrable standard that cannot produce its
intended effects?
Thus we are brought back to the
challenge of regulating professions.
Lawmakers do not understand medicine's work well enough to set standards
for it. So medicine's standard must be
adopted. The long-standing principleinformed consent-is administratively
practical but a paper tiger. The rising
principle-shared decision-making-is
so inchoate that it is not even a paper
mouse. And so ... ?
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